сравнение двух статей по философии (15000 знаков с пробелами)

The third section capitalizes on and implements the outcomes of the preceding section to argue for an ecological/representational structure of VEs. The final section is devoted to some conclusions and issues for future research.As stated above, the common assumption of the Ecological View is that VEs are isomorphic to real environments to the extent that the perception/action dynamics of the former can be modeled on the ecological structure of the latter. This assumption implies that (a) “virtual perception” and “virtual action” are inherently related via “virtual affordances”, and (b) agents navigating through VEs directly perceive the action opportunities furnished by virtual objects and virtual agents. It should be noted here that, though the isomorphism between real environments and VEs is mutatis mutandis structurally and functionally valid, it is nonetheless partial. This is so because, to date, some real-world affordances cannot be mapped onto their virtual counterparts. For example, a virtual fruit affords, say, “grasp-ability”, manipulability, “throw-ability”, but not edibility. Equally, a virtual glass of water affords “reachability” and “break-ability”, but not “drink-ability”. However, these extreme cases of technological irreproducibility of affordances do not undermine the basic assumption of the Ecological View since the essentials of perception and action in real environments can be reliably applied to VEs.This reliability or ecological validity of VEs is largely contingent on designers’ accurate understanding of the nature of affordances. For a VE to be meaningful in the ecological sense, programmers and software developers have to provide users with sensible relations between actions, affects and effects, no matter whether the VE is designed for psychological therapies, collaborative learning, or even video games in which agents can fly, resuscitate, clone themselves, or metamorphose into other creatures. Such relations represent a design commitment to provide a satisfacing compromise between virtual events, available actions, and users’ expectations. Furthermore, designers of VEs must be aware that the meaning of virtual actions is not just a construct of the user’s mind. Sufficient and clearly detectable physical, semantic, and cultural information has to be provided by the very structure of the objects and agents inhabiting a given VE in order to afford users the possibility of choosing between alternate patterns of action marked by explicit degrees of freedom. Defenders of the Ecological View of VEs consider Gibson’s ecological approach to perception as a compelling framework for disposing of representations and validating a direct, embodied account of perception and action in VEs. Animated by this ecological impetus, they claim that the Traditional View is inadequate because of its artificial separation between objective (sensory information) and subjective (cognitive processing) dimensions of perceptual experiences, thus conveying the idea of an agent interacting in a distal, disincarnated way with his (real and/or virtual) surroundings. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that in view of recent functional accounts of perception and action originated from evolutionary, psychological, and neurophysiological perspectives, Gibson’s ecological approach needs some critical scrutiny in order to test its basic tenets and concepts for theoretical accuracy and explanatory power. The outcomes of such a scrutiny will certainly have an impact on the way the Ecological View conceives of the structure of VEs. In the following section, three arguments coming from the aforementioned perspectives will be analyzed.We have seen that, despite the claims of the Ecological View of VEs, a representational account of perception and action, either in real or virtual environments, is compatible with an embodied, ecological conception such as that championed by Gibson. This compatibility resides in the fact that, pace Gibson, not any representational account of perception necessarily implies a pictorial conception of representation or a dualistic view of perceptual experiences. Arguments from evolutionary, cognitive, and neuroanatomical studies have proven to be helpful to elucidate a functional, representational model of perception and action, and to favor an ecological/representational explanation of the structure of VEs, without having to betray the ecological, and certainly theoretically valuable, view of embodied perception. Accounts of cognition and environmental complexity, decoupled representations, and common coding for perception and action, have yielded compelling reasons for arguing that perceptual and agentic processes can be ecological as well as representational. The implications of this for the design of VEs have been explored. The ecological/representational analysis of VEs provided here, makes clear that for meaningful use of VEs, users draw on their natural cognitive, representational endowment to accurately track structural and functional correspondences between real and virtual worlds. This point has been argued to be useful for VE designers, since it is their understanding of how affordances and significant features are perceived and engaged in that will make a VE epistemically transparent, translucent or opaque.