«Influence of the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Kosovo on the Level of Democratization in the region: 1999-2023»

Observers were trained at the temporary training center Brezovica (Pristina). A staff reception and training center was established in Skopje (Macedonia). In total, approximately 1,300 observers were deployed to the OSCE Mission in Kosovo region. The leadership of the Mission was entrusted to the American diplomat W. Walker.In addition, a special OSCE working group operated in Albania, the main task of which was to coordinate actions to assist the country’s leadership in matters of state building, economics and internal security.At the end of October 1998, the North Atlantic Alliance and the OSCE routinely agreed on the coordination of the actions of these organizations during NATO aerial surveillance operations over the territory of Kosovo region (common name "Eagle Eye") and OSCE operations to monitor the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution. It was envisaged to organize the exchange of information obtained as a result of the verification activities of the OSCE and NATO. Particular importance was given to ensuring communication directly between the Mission's field offices and the command of the NATO aviation group involved in Operation Eagle Eye, between the mission's headquarters in Pristina and the NATO coordination center for the collection and processing of intelligence information in Macedonia.Subsequently, the NATO leadership initiated the beginning of elaboration of a request from the OSCE for assistance in the evacuation of Mission personnel from Kosovo region in the event of a crisis situation in the region. After a corresponding appeal, the bloc’s command, in agreement with the leadership of Macedonia, deployed the security forces of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo region (SOB, which included 2.4 thousand people - military personnel from France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic) on the territory of the republic.The Mission's activities were aimed at stabilizing the situation in Kosovo region. In particular, with the direct participation of Mission employees, agreements were reached between the warring parties to reduce the scope of Serbian police patrols in the region and to renounce the Kosovo region Liberation Army units from blocking the main transport routes. During the same period, international observers achieved the release of hostages held by the KLA, and also contributed to the process of returning refugees to their places of permanent residence, restoring energy and food supplies in the crisis area.At the same time, according to the Yugoslav leadership, there was a biased coverage of the situation in Kosovo region on the part of the head of the Mission when preparing information transmitted to the leadership of the OSCE and NATO.The facts of violation of the ceasefire agreements by the Albanian side were kept silent. This contributed to a decrease in the level of trust in the observers on the part of the Serbian population and significantly hampered the work of the Mission. After W. Walker’s participation on February 11, 1999 in the funeral of 40 Albanians killed by Serbian police near the village of Racak on January 15, the leadership of the FRY decided to declare W. Walker persona non grata. The implementation of this decision was suspended only thanks to the efforts of international diplomacy.In February 1999, during negotiations in Rambouillet (France) to resolve the Kosovo region crisis, the leadership of the Mission, without agreement with the Yugoslav side, began to explore options for changing its structure and tasks in connection with the possible introduction of NATO troops into the territory of the region. It was intended to transfer all functions related to military issues and monitoring the situation in the region to the corresponding NATO structures. In this case, it was planned to involve the OSCE mission in providing assistance in organizing the population census, preparing and conducting elections. Mission headquarters estimated that it would be reduced to 400 observers.Due to the sharp aggravation of the situation in the region, as well as the possibility of the start of a NATO operation against the FRY, the OSCE leadership decided on March 20, 1999 to withdraw observers of the OSCE Mission from Kosovo region to Macedonia. By decision of OSCE Chairman K. Vollebaek, the Mission’s activities were suspended, and on March 29, the number of observers began to be reduced. The decision on personal selection was made by the head of the Mission, W. Walker, as a result of which about 80% of the remaining employees turned out to be representatives of NATO member countries.In general, at this stage, the OSCE has not been able to fully realize its potential in preventing and resolving the Kosovo region crisis. Moreover, the unilateral focus of the leadership of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo region on close cooperation with NATO not only did not lead to the development of a solution acceptable to the warring parties, but rather contributed to the escalation of the conflict and the start of NATO’s military operation against Yugoslavia.In the context of a sharp deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region, the OSCE leadership decided to temporarily reorient the Mission to work with refugees from Kosovo region and monitor the situation in this region. At the same time, it was envisaged to involve the Mission’s personnel not only on the territory of Macedonia, but also in Albania. Before the end of the NATO military operation in the FRY, organizing work with Kosovo region refugees became the main function of OSCE staff. According to a number of experts, this task was carried out quite effectively by the Mission in cooperation with humanitarian organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross.The next stage in the OSCE's activities was participation in the process of post-conflict organization of the region in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution No. 1244 (dated June 10, 1999) of the UN Security Council. In order to achieve maximum efficiency, the UN civilian mission in Kosovo region was divided into areas of responsibility between the main international organizations (UN, UNHCR, OSCE, EU). The OSCE was entrusted with the task of ensuring institutional development. Activities in the field of institutional development include four main functions:a) strengthening human resources in the judiciary, police and public administration;b) democratization and governance;c) monitoring the situation in the field of human rights and strengthening capacity in this area;d) holding and observing elections.Strengthening civil society institutions, especially independent local media, is also key to achieving these goals. Currently, the OSCE Mission, working in close cooperation with UN missions and the KFOR contingent, is trying to provide conditions for restoring peaceful life in the region, which formally still remains a multinational province of Serbia. However, the only truly effective and authoritative force in Kosovo region is the Kosovo region Liberation Army (de jure transformed into a “civilian force of a humanitarian nature”), whose cooperation with international forces, including the OSCE Mission, can’t yet be called productive . This factor, of course, negatively affects the results of the Mission’s work, especially in terms of ensuring human rights, peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups in the region and democratization.2.3.3 Positive vs Negative Dynamics: Assessing Institutional ProgressThus, despite having some potential for resolving conflicts through political decisions, the OSCE in the Balkan crisis was unable to demonstrate sufficient effectiveness as an independent institution for ensuring European security. Among the main factors that influenced this development of the situation are:a) differences in understanding of the role of the OSCE in the new European security system by the states that took an active part in resolving the conflict in Kosovo region (primarily the USA, Russia, states of Western and Eastern Europe);b) the OSCE lacks an independent effective force component for resolving conflict situations or a proven mechanism for using military structures of other organizations responsible for security (NATO, UN, WEU) for peacekeeping purposes in the area of OSCE responsibility;c) limited mobility of OSCE structures in situations requiring rapid decision-making (in particular, due to the decision-making procedure by consensus, which is certainly important for taking into account the interests of all OSCE member states);d) the existence of differences in the understanding of the division of responsibilities between NATO and the OSCE in the CEE region and, as a result, the problem of determining the mechanism and limit of policy coherence of these two organizations in each specific conflict.However, it should be noted that at the stages of preventive diplomacy and especially the post-conflict peace organization (institutional aspect), the OSCE has accumulated productive experience, which was applied with varying degrees of success in Kosovo region.In general, it seems realistic and necessary for the OSCE to be active in the following areas:a) in developing norms of behavior in the field of security, thereby providing all states with the opportunity to feel confident;b) in developing early warning and conflict resolution capabilities, thereby collectively providing a certain degree of security to those states that are not members of regional or other defense organizations.Chapter 3. Statistical evaluation of organizational effectiveness3.1 Methodology: Assessing Effectiveness through Demographic IndicesAccording to the UN, an average of 13 thousand children are born in Kosovo region every year and 15 thousand marriages take place. It is curious that the Albanian authorities report about 30 thousand newborns, recording in the statistics all Kosovar Albanians by origin born anywhere in the world.As Serbian researcher Dr. Jovan Kršić notes, with 13 thousand newborns per 1.8 million population (that is how many live in the region according to official data), the birth rate in Kosovo region is several times lower than in Albania or even Latvia. This number is more consistent with a population of about 1 million inhabitants.The death toll of 8.7 thousand people per year for a population of 1.8 million suddenly puts Kosovo region in a leadership position with one of the lowest mortality rates in the world: then it is time for doctors from the United States and Israel to come to the region to study. If we assume that the average age of residents and mortality rates in Kosovo region, Macedonia and Albania are equal, then the population of Kosovo region should be even less than a million people.Kosovo region's public sector employs 80,000 people, again making it a champion in the fight against bureaucracy. True, there are exactly 7 times fewer officials in Kosovo region than in Serbia with a population of 7 million. And again we get the same “magic” figure - population 1 million.According to the Kosovo region Statistics Agency, in the coming years the population of Kosovo region will decrease by 10 thousand people per year and by 2061 will decrease from 1.8 million to 1.4 million, and according to a pessimistic scenario - to 0.68 million. If we assume a population of 1 million, the prospects will be even more dismal.Kosovo region, unlike central Serbia, does not have and is not expected to have money for programs to increase the birth rate. Funds for programs for the return of emigrants who left to the region, the construction of factories and research centers - too. Is the loss of Kosovo region inevitable and do the Serbs have a chance, having corrected the demography, to repopulate the original Serbian region?The question also arises whether the West’s haste in imposing an agreement with Pristina on Belgrade is not related to these sad statistics. Is there any point in rushing to “recognize” or is it worth prolonging the “frozen conflict” with all our might? It is important for the Serbs not to make a mistake with their answer, so that later they will not be ashamed in front of their descendants.3.2 Comparative Analysis: Pre, During, and Post-Mission EffectivenessThe United Nations Interim Administration Mission Kosovo region (UNMIK) was charged with protecting human rights of Albanian Kosovars, building a stabile political system, and trying to arrange a settlement with Serbia in connection with independence for Kosovo region. First of all, calling UNMIK a complete failure would be overstretching the truth. It did manage to calm a volatile situation, with noticeable successes in the department of justice and security.However, in its main objective, namely to agree a settlement with Serbia, they did not succeed. Along with this, most experts agree that the UN also failed to create a stabile political system with working institutions to support a working administration. The main reason for this failure seemed to be that UNMIK did not involve local population in their decision-making. By marginalizing them, support for UNMIK became more and more limited throughout the years. This gradually squeezed the credibility out of UNMIK, leading to its eventual demise in 2007. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan already sensed in 2005 that a different approach towards the region was necessary. Talking about peacekeeping missions in general, he stressed the need for ‘participatory governance’. In other words, he wanted the local population to become more involved in the decision-making process. The Secretary-General sent Norwegian Diplomat Kai Eide to Kosovo region to set up a full rapport on the situation in the region. Eide wrote in findings that the UN was losing its grip on the region, and proposed a take-over from EU to restore stability in Kosovo region.Overall, the UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo region can’t be called a complete failure. Definitely on a humanitarian level, crimes against the Kosovo region population did decrease. Politically however, it did not succeed. Institutions were built, but did not work and UNMIK quickly became incredibly unpopular with the locals, due to their lack of involvement. It can however be argued that the UNMIK operations provided a good platform for the EU to take over their work, which is now working to slowly create a path to full scale, functioning independence for Kosovo region.3.3 Area-Specific Evaluation: Successes and Failures in Different Sectors3.3.1 Case Study: Human Rights Progress and ChallengesThe United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo region (UNMIK) was charged with protecting the human rights of Kosovo region Albanians, building a stable political system, and trying to arrange an agreement with Serbia regarding Kosovo region's independence. First of all, calling UNMiK a complete failure would be an overstatement of the truth. This succeeded in calming the explosive situation, with notable successes in the administration of justice and security.However, they failed in their main goal, namely to agree on an agreement with Serbia. Along with this, most experts agree that the UN has also failed to create a stable political system with workers' institutions supporting workers' administration. The main reason for this failure seemed to be that UNMIK did not involve the local population in the decision-making process. As marginalized, their support for UNMIK became increasingly limited over the years. This gradually squeezed trust out of UNMIK, leading to its final death in 2007. Then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan already felt in 2005 that a different approach to the region was necessary. Speaking about peacekeeping missions in general, he emphasized the need for "participatory management." In other words, he wanted the local population to participate more actively in the decision-making process. The Secretary General directed Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide Kosovo region to create a full rapport on the situation in the region. Eide wrote in his conclusions that the UN was losing control of the region, and proposed a takeover from the EU to restore stability in Kosovo region.Overall, the UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo regioncan’t be called a complete failure. Certainly on a humanitarian level, crimes against the population of Kosovo region have decreased. Politically, however, this failed. Facilities were built but did not work and UNMIK quickly became incredibly unpopular with local residents due to their lack of involvement. It can, however, be argued that the UNMIK operation has provided a good platform for the EU to take over its work, which is now slowly working to pave the way for Kosovo region's full-scale, functioning independence.Time will tell whether the current EU operation will prove more successful than its predecessor, and whether local people will continue to accept international involvement.The United Nations has received a stunning rebuke from a human rights group for its troubled peacekeeping mission in Kosovo region, which described the group's efforts to hold the mission accountable for rights abuses as a “total failure.”The 49-page report by the Human Rights Advisory Panel of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo region, or UNOC, is extremely critical of the mission's handling of civilian complaints, including failure to investigate disappearances and killings and negligence. in the mass lead poisoning of displaced Roma, also known as Gypsies, in United Nations camps.The report's findings are a potential source of embarrassment for the United Nations, which regularly accuses governments of lacking accountability and defends victims whose human rights have been violated in conflict zones around the world.“Due to UNK's reluctance to follow any of the Panel's recommendations and UNK's general intransigence,” the report said, the Panel's own work “failed to provide redress to the claimants.”“Thus, they became victims of MONK twice: because of the initial human rights violations committed against them, and again because they placed their hopes and trust in the process,” it says.Moonk officials were not immediately able to comment on the report, which was completed in June and made public Wednesday.The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, which oversees UNK, said in a statement that “UNK values the work of its advisory group” and noted that the group is not a tribunal.The report is the latest annual report from the three-member team of international legal experts, which ceased operations on July 1.United Nations peacekeeping operations are under scrutiny for other issues, including sexual violence by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic, a protracted cholera crisis in Haiti involving infected peacekeepers, and allegations that the peacekeeping mission is South Sudan failed to protect civilians.The report attacked what it described as a pattern of UNK dysfunction that dates back years before the creation of the team that was supposed to address persistent problems in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo region. MONK was deployed following the outbreak of war in 1998 between Serbia and ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo region.In examining complaints against Moonk, the group focused heavily on allegations of negligence as hundreds of displaced Roma families were abandoned in squalid United Nations camps built on lead-contaminated land. The camps were demolished in 2010.Experience has shown that there are several factors that are of particular importance to the success of a peacekeeping operation, which must:• be based on the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in cases of self-defense and defense of the mandate;• represent a legitimate and authoritative structure, in particular in the eyes of the local population;• promote active involvement of the host country in the peace process at local and national levels.Other important factors contributing to success include:• sincere commitment of the parties to the political process in order to achieve peace (in order to maintain peace, it must first be established);• clear, precise and implementable mandates with adequate personnel and logistical and financial resources;• unity of purpose within the Security Council while ensuring active support for UN operations on the ground;• provision of assistance by the host country to UN operations and ensuring freedom of movement;• support from neighboring countries and regional entities;• application of an integrated approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and appropriate communications with authorities and the population of the host country;• Maximum consideration of the interests of the local population and adherence to the highest standards of professionalism and appropriate behavior (peacekeepers should not be part of the problem).ConclusionThus, the following conclusions can be drawn.The UN is a mandate for legitimate action in the world. The UN is effective when there is unity among the five permanent members of the Security Council regarding what needs to be done, or a tacit understanding among one or two members that there is no need to interfere - and then something can be done. As the Kosovo region conflict showed, when there is no unity among the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN is powerless. But contradictions can’t be escalated; the mechanism must be improved to cope with situations that threaten to destroy the international security system. This is what UN reform is mainly aimed at.The universal foundations of the UN must be preserved. Changes must be effective but careful, especially in sensitive areas such as safety. In the context of the growing influence of regional organizations in the regulation of international conflicts, Russia insists that the central role in the field of peacekeeping should belong only to the UN as a global mechanism that makes it possible to avoid the manifestation of narrow national interests in approaching conflicts to a greater extent than to regional mechanisms. Negative trends in the world have not yet been eliminated: the conflict space in world politics is expanding. Regional conflicts, which pose an even greater danger than global ones, are becoming particularly acute. Legal norms for resolving international conflicts do not always fully reflect the specifics of resolving regional conflicts.At the same time, it is becoming increasingly obvious that existing international problems do not have forceful solutions. For most countries, the UN is preferable because it allows the armed forces of states that are not members of military-political blocs to participate in peacekeeping and “peace enforcement” operations. In matters of applying sanctions through the UN, Russia proceeds from the fact that various restrictive measures can be introduced exclusively by Security Council resolutions. Such decisions should remain a last resort when other means of influence have been exhausted. Decisions to impose sanctions must be strictly adequate to the existing threat, provide for clear restrictions on their duration, the possibility of review, the procedure for canceling such measures, and contain humanitarian supplies.Relevant expert specialized agencies and units of the UN Secretariat should make advance assessments of the possible humanitarian consequences of sanctions, even at the stage of considering the feasibility of their introduction by the Security Council. Many norms of international law require clarification and bringing into line with modern realities.Thus, there are necessary and sufficient conditions to overcome the crisis in UN peacekeeping. This is what the UN reform and Russia's constructive, consistent activities in this most important area are aiming at. To eliminate the UN as an outdated mechanism means to destroy the entire system of international security. If another international organization is created - an analogue of the UN - it will be without Russia's participation.Looking at Kosovo region's economic, political and social indicators, the region, which has partial international recognition, is far from prosperous. Many international experts point to the insolvency of the Kosovo region government. The current international political situation has shifted public attention to other regions (Transnistria, Ukraine, the Middle East, etc.), leaving Kosovo region to solve its problems on its own. Of course, partial recognition of the region became a precedent that gave rise to a number of similar situations. Residents of Kosovo region, having received sovereignty, leave for other countries and boost other people's economies. Albania, unlike Serbia, is not able to provide political and economic support to the region.In conclusion, the author summarizes the main results of the study.The essence of the Kosovo region crisis was the contradiction with deep historical roots between the leadership and people of Serbia, on the one hand, and the autonomous region defending its independence, on the other. The separatist actions of the Kosovars, who relied on the Albanian ethnic majority, threatened the integrity of the Serbian state. At the same time, the quantitative advantage of the Albanian population in Kosovo region in itself did not give it the right to self-determination in the form of secession, in violation of one of the basic principles of international law - the principle of territorial integrity of states. However, the separatist aspirations of the Kosovo region Albanians began to be actively supported by the United States and its NATO partners. On the way to achieving their geostrategic goals, they tried to make maximum use of internal contradictions in the region, which significantly increased the scale of the Kosovo region crisis.In the work, the author identifies a number of periods of internationalization of the conflict and notes that, having arisen from intraregional contradictions and problems, the Kosovo region crisis reached its climax in the 90s. XX - early XXI centuries. precisely because of its internationalization.The compromise UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244 adopted on June 10, 1999 was controversial. Its provisions gave rise to various interpretations: both taking into account the fair interests of Serbia, and in violation of them. Resolution No. 1244, as a result of the activities of the United States and NATO, served as an important step towards changing the status of Kosovo region and the withdrawal of the region from Serbia.The Kosovo region crisis and its development once again highlighted the unresolved problems of international law: the relationship between the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples and nations and the principle of territorial integrity of states; the relationship between the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state and the right of any state or group of states to “humanitarian intervention”, given the uncertainty of this last concept; the relationship between the functions of the UN Security Council and the right of any state or group of states to resolve issues of military intervention without the sanction of the UN Security Council; the relationship between the traditional task of the UN, which is to resolve interstate conflicts, and the modern need to resolve intrastate conflicts.In the context of the world's transition from unipolarity and the emergence of a multipolar international system, the lack of clear international legal norms and their compliance may pose new security threats. Therefore, the role of the UN as a leading international organization, and especially in peacekeeping activities, should only be strengthened.Reference listBaliqi, B. (2019). Consociational democracy, citizenship and the role of the EU in Kosovo region’s contested state-building. Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 11(1).Brand, M., & Centre d'études pratiques de la négociation internationale (Genève). The rehabilitation of war-torn societies. (2003). The development of Kosovo region institutions and the transition of authority from UNMIK to local self-government. Geneva: CASIN.Factsheet: OSCE mission in Kosovo region. (2023). Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.https://www.osce.org/mission-in-Kosovo region/546441Friedrich, J. (2005). UNMIK in Kosovo region: struggling with uncertainty. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 9(1), 225-293.Judah, T. (2008). Kosovo region: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.Keohane, R. (2011). Neoliberal institutionalism. In Security Studies (pp. 157-164). Routledge.Knudsen, T. B., & Laustsen, C. B. (Eds.). (2006). Kosovo region between war and peace: nationalism, peacebuilding and international trusteeship (Vol. 23). Routledge.Kosovo region - Security Council, 9450th meeting. (2023, October 23). UN Web TV. https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1c/k1cyaxhyldLemay-Hébert, N. (2009). STATE-BUILDING FROM THE OUTSIDE-IN: UNMIK AND ITS PARADOχ.Scheye, E. (2008). UNMIK and the significance of effective programme management: The case of Kosovo region. Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experiences from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo region. Edited by H. Hänggi and V. Scherrer. Geneva: DCAF, 169-228.Tansey, O. (2009). Kosovo region: Independence and tutelage. J. Democracy, 20, 153.UNDP publishes Public Pulse Brief #24. (n.d.). UNDP. https://www.undp.org/Kosovo region/press-releases/undp-publishes-public-pulse-brief-24United Nations Security Council. (1999). Resolution 1244 (1999) [On the situation in Kosovo region].https://undocs.org/S/RES/1244(1999)USAID. (n.d.). Democracy, human rights, and governance in Kosovo region. IDEA. https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/Kosovo region/democracy-human-rights-and-governanceYannis, A. (2001). Kosovo region under international administration. Survival, 43(2), 31-48.Yannis, A. (2004). The UN as government in Kosovo region. Global governance, 10, 6.